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WHATELY ON PRESUMPTION AND BURDEN OF PROOF 
David Walker 
In his Elements of Rhetoric, Richard Whately presents princi-
ples concerning presumption and burden of proof which continue to 
influence argumentation theorists. Rather than furnishing a practi-
cal tool to enable the advocate and defender to advance their causes, 
Whately's system actually bears evidence of being an arbitrarily 
conceived system for justifying his own religious beliefs. This 
paper will initially outline Whately's basic position on presump-
tion and burden of proof, and then will focus on the elements that 
indicate the arbitrary nature of the system. 
At the onset of a case, Whately declares, one should always 
decide on which side lies the presumption and which side. bears the 
burden of proof. Presumption is "such a pre-occupation of the ground, 
as implies that it must stand good till some sutt1~1ent reason is 
adduced against it; in short, that the burden of proof lies on the 
side of him who would dispute it. ,.l If a person has the presumption 
on his side, and can but refute all the arguments brought against 
2 his case, he has gained at least a temporary victory. To illustrate 
his definition, Whately reminds the reader that every man is to be 
considered innocent until his guilt has been established. The 
burden of proof would rest with he who doubts his innocence. 
Likewise, Whately argues, there is a presumption in favor of any 
individuals in actual possession of property. Although they may ij 
not be the rightful owners, they will retain the property until 
some claim against them has been established.J 
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Whately continues his list of some presumptions. A pre-
sumption rests in favor of any existing institution• according 
to Whately, no one need defend such an institution until some 
argument be brought against it. Finally, there is a presumption 
4 
against anything contrary to the prevailing opinion. 
At this point, Whately, a bishop in the Church of England, 
pauses to present some applications of his principles to Chris-
tianity. When the gospel was first preached, a presumption rested 
against it. The burden of proof lay with he who claimed to be the 
deliverer of mankind. After the establishment of Christianity, 
the situation, according to Whately, reversed itself. The pre-
sumption now rested with Christianity and the burden of proof lay 
with he who would bring any charges against it. In referring to 
the Reformation, Whately contends that its authors h&d a responsi-
bility to present reasons for every change which was made; however, 
they were not bound to give any causes for retaining what was left 
5 
unaltered, as the presumption rested with that which was retained. 
In further discussing presumption, Whately contends that "a 
presumption may be rebutted by an opposite presumption, so as to 
shift the burden of proof to the other side.- His illustration of 
this principle supposes an argument against some existing institution• 
under such a situation, the advocate would be charged with the burden 
of proof and the presumption would rest with his opponent. It would 
be possible, contends Whately, to argue that every type of restriction 
is a form of evil1 under such a situation, the presumption would shift 
to the side of the person proposing a change, and the burden of proof 
6 
would rest with the one defending the e~isting institution. 
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One should not conclude, Whately reasons, that any advantage 
necessarily rests with the one in whose favor there is a pre-
sumptionJ often, the opposite would be true. Whately illustrates 
his point by mentioning people who have taken the principles of 
their religious faith for granted, without being_ stimulated to 
find reasons for the profession of that faith. When believers are 
unable to repel objections, they may become skeptics. 7 
Several illustrations point out the way in which Whately's 
system bears evidence of having been constructed to prove his own 
religious propositions. For instance, Whately does perceive that 
presumption may vary with different audiences in different 
occasions a 
It should be also remarked under this head, that in any 
one question the presumption will often be found to lie 
on different sides, in respect of different parties. 
E.g., in the question between a member of the Church of 
England, and a Presbyterian, or member of any other 
church, on which side does the presumption lie? Evidently, 
to each, in favor of the religious community to which 
he at present belongs. He is not to separate from the 
church of which he is a member' without having some 
sufficient reason to allege. 
The reason for presumption's varying is not, however, because of 
the varying beliefs or attitudes of the audience. Rather, 
Whately's arbitrarily constructed rule is that "He is not to 
separate from the church of which he is a member, without having 
some sufficient reason to allege." Far from considering audience 
composition and sentiment in determining presumption, Whately 
goes so far as to suggest that it is a point of great importance 
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to "clearly point out to the hearer" on which side the presumption 
9 
lies. The listener is not given the choice of furnishing his own 
criteria as to what will be necessary in his case for him to believe 
or disbelieve a proposition. Rather, he is given a set of rules 
and is expected to award his consent to the one who best uses the 
rules. 
A second instance of Whately's arbitrary rhetoric shows 
Whately declining the challenge to submit evidences for the case of 
Christianity; rather, he contents himself with merely meeting the 
10 
attacks brought against it. Whately does recognize some value 
11 
in constructing an affirmative position, but he is careful to 
maintain that such is not his duty. Somehow he is under the mistaken 
assumption that faith may be produced in a skeptic simply by over-
coming objections. 
Whately furthermore uses fallacious reasoning as he applies 
his rhetorical principles to his religious beliefs. He is very 
careful to contend that it is not necessary for the one who practices 
infant baptism to show authority for the practice; the burden of 
proof rests with the one who denies it. Again, using the same 
reasoning, Whately contends that it is not necessary for him to prove 
the case of the Episcopacy; the burden of proof rests with the one 
who denies its authority. As he approaches the subject of tradition, 
however, this type of reasoning is abandoned. Consistency would de-
mand that he should have reasoned that it would not be necessary for 
the believer in the authority of tradition to prove his case, but 
that the burden of proof would rest with the one who denies it; this 
would have placed the burden of proof upon Whately and his colleagues. 
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In order to remedy such a situation, Whately adopts this reasoning• 
A presumption is in favor of commands and prohibitfons which the 
Lord or his apostles delivered1 the burden of proof would rest with 
12 
he who would introduce some additional article of faith. Using 
this reasoning, Whately can ignore the fact that tradition was 
used by many theologians as an authoritative source from the seventh 
lJ 
century onward. Ignoring the age of the practice of tradition, 
Whately dogmatically declares that a presumption is in favor of his 
beliefs. Both methods of reasoning cannot be considered equally 
valid, as their applications contradict each other. If the latter 
form of reasoning had been applied to the first illustrations (infant 
baptism, the Episcopacy), then the burden of proof would have shifted 
to the adherents of Whately's beliefs. For instance, no command 
is given by Christ or the apostles favoring infant baptism; the 
burden of proof would rest with the one who introduces i~. This 
apparent inconsistency -- using completely antithetical types of 
reasoning to establish different parts of a religious system -- is 
one of the clearest evidences that Whately's system is arbitrary 
rather than functional. 
Any principles concerning presumption and burden of proof 
should be constructed in light of a careful audience analysis. The 
speaker, rather than giving an audience an arbitrarily constructed 
system of rules telling them how they should judge whe~her or not 
an advocate has carried his case, should instead analyze his audience 
to determine where the presumption and burden of proof rest in that 
particular audience. 
Furthermore, a burden of proof may exist on both sides of some 
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questions in dispute. An advocate with the presumption in his favor 
may win a temporary "victory" if he simply repels his opponent's 
objections. A responsibility rests~ however, with the advocate to 
instruct his audience concerning his beliefs, so that there may exist 
solid foundations for their sentiments. If such is not done, the 
members of an audience, in a different situation, may be unable to 
justify their beliefs and may give them up. 
In summary, Whately's rhetorical principles concerning pre-
sumption and burden of proof bear evidences of having been arbitrarily 
constructed to justify his own religious beliefs. A more functional 
rhetorical system would have placed the emphasis upon audience 
analysis. 
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